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Abstract 
We model the area allocation decision problem for a fixed size crop farm under random 
yields and prices for a risk-averse farmer. We assume that in the short run, the variable 
input expenses are fixed per hectare and per crop (an assumption that is motivated by our 
data). Therefore the cost function depends only on the non-stochastic area allocation. The 
first order conditions of the model involve integrals across functions of random variables 
that do not in general have closed form solutions. Numerical simulation techniques are 
used to calibrate the parameters of the cost function. 
The  two  sources  of  randomness,  price  and  yield,  are  combined  into  a  single  random 
variable, the  yield-in-value. Based on examination of panels of  yield-in-value data, we 
assume independence across the  yield-in-value  distributions and that the farmers know 
these distributions. 
We have modeled the sugar quota constraint, the Common Agricultural Policy subsidies 
and set-aside, and one Agri-Environmental Measure called “buffer zone”. 2 
 
   
 




In this paper, we are interested in constructing a model for Northwestern European crop 
farms, exploiting two EU databases: The Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) and the 
agricultural land covers census. We model the short-run area allocation decision problem 
for a fixed size crop farm under random yields and prices. The model is currently in an 
intermediate phase. 
We assume that farmers intend to maximize the expected utility of their net stochastic 
income. The utility function reflects risk-aversion. Income consists of stochastic revenues 
(prices times quantities) minus the cost of production. We assume constant per hectare 
variable input expenses. Even though that assumption may appear strong, farmers in our 
sample  present  fairly  stable  input  expenses  and  most  variable  input  expenses  are 
committed at the time of area allocation. Therefore, the cost of production is a function of 
only the vector of decision variables (the area allocations) and not of any random element. 
The cost of production can then be captured through a non-stochastic cost function. That is 
an important advantage of the model (see e.g. Moschini, 2001).  
At the time of allocation, neither prices nor yields are known for sure. These two sources 
of randomness are combined in the model into a single one: the random yield-in-value. 
Examination of panels of yield-in-value data for individual farmers from the FADN sample 
for  the  Walloon  region  of  Belgium  for  the  period  1995-2004  have  led  us  to  assume 
independence across the distributions of yield-in-value for different crops based on fixed 
effects panel data model residuals. This is important because the first order conditions of 
the model involve integrals across functions of (possibly non-normal) random yields-in-3 
 
   
 
value. Those integrals do not in general have closed form solutions, but since there is 
independence  of  the  yield-in-value  residual  distributions,  we  can  easily  make  use  of 
simulation techniques to find numerical solutions for the parameters of the cost function. 
The distributions are not always normal; in particular, skewed-to-left distributions may fit 
the wheat yield-in-value best, possibly reflecting the price floor (“intervention”) policy of 
the EU. The model assumes that the farmers know these distributions, an assumption that 
we regard as a generalization of the adaptive expectation hypothesis. 
Theoretically, our land allocation model is similar to Chavas and Holt’s (1990), however 
they consider an aggregate (representative) farmer who is not subject to land constraint; it 
is therefore not an allocation problem. Guyomard, Baudry and Carpentier (1996) consider 
land  as  a  fixed  and  allocatable  factor,  but  they  use  a  sector  level  model  that  is  not 
stochastic. Moro and Sckokai (1999) develop a farm-level non-stochastic land allocation 
model. Sckokai and Moro (2006) present a generalization of Moro and Sckokai (1999) to 
the  case  of  stochastic  prices  together  with  a  mean-variance  utility  function.  In  some 
respects, such as random yields, Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function and the 
modeling of the beet sugar quota, our model is more general. However, Sckokai and Moro 
(2006) go much further in the modeling of the farmer’s choice of crops and inputs. 
Currently,  we  apply  the  model  to  single  farms  in  the  FADN  sample  by  means  of  a 
calibration approach. We assume that the cost function has a quadratic form and impose 
that the off-diagonal terms are zero. We calibrate it on the basis of the last year of fully 
complete available data (2003). We adjust the variable cost taken from the FADN for the 
opportunity cost of land implied by the total area constraint. We assume that the utility 
function has a Constant Relative Risk Aversion form.  
Using this framework, numerous policies can be simulated. In particular, we argue that in a 
stochastic framework with risk aversion every policy change has to be considered not only 
from the point of view of its effect on the expected value of the random variables of the 4 
 
   
 
model, but also on their variance. For a subsample of 24 FADN crop farms, we have 
simulated the following scenarios.  
A reduction of the price of wheat under the form of a production “tax” (the negative of an 
output subsidy) equal to 10% of the average price of wheat induces a reduction in the total 
wheat area of about 3.5%; a decrease of 10% of the price of wheat induces roughly the 
same reduction of the wheat area. This is surprising since the former type of price decrease 
has practically no effect on the variance of the yield in value while the later type induces 
nearly a 20% decrease  in variance. This is however  consistent with the result that the 
introduction of crop insurance for wheat has negligible impacts on the area allocations. 
This is due to the fact that both yield and price of wheat are already quite stable in that 
region; therefore changes in variance are relatively unimportant compared to changes in 
expectation. 
Sugar beet production is very important for Walloon farmers. It is also a heavily regulated 
sector, in which beet growers own delivery rights to sugar refineries at a guaranteed high 
price. We model two scenarios. In one, we let the world price for sugar drop to zero; that 
scenario is intended to represent a ban on EU sugar exports. On average that scenario leads 
to a reduction of the beet sugar hectarage of nearly 9%. In the second scenario, the beet 
growers’ delivery rights are decreased by 10%. The result is a reduction of sugar beet area 
of only 2.5%. That suggests that at least a few Walloon beet growers are able to sell sugar 
profitably on the world market. 
Finally, we have modeled one Agri-Environmental Measure (AEM) from the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy accompanying measures. This AEM is called buffer zones; farmers 
who chose to uptake it have to maintain large strips of the local flora on the perimeter of 
their fields. We treat the buffer zones AEM as if it was an additional crop, without an 
output, but with an area subsidy. The model can be used to show that a 10% increase of the 
buffer zones subsidy leads to a 5 to 6% increase of the buffer zones area in our sample.  5 
 
   
 
The remainder of the paper is divided in four parts. In the next section, we present the 
model for crops farms, including subsidies, mandatory set aside, sugar quota and buffer 
zones. In section three, we give a description of a sample of purely crops farms extracted 
from  the  FADN  sample  for  the  Walloon  region.  Section  four  presents  several  policy 
simulations  and  their  effects  on  the  area  allocation  choices.  Section  five  discusses  the 
results. 
 
2. The model 
 
This section is divided in four parts. We first motivate the model, then we introduce a core 
model designed to capture the short-run behavior of a generic multi-output crop farm in a 
hypothetical  environment  without  agricultural  policy  distortions.  Next  we  introduce 
subsidies per hectare and mandatory set aside, reflecting EU agricultural policies. In the 
third part, we introduce the modeling of the sugar sector. In our sample nearly all the crop 
farms produce sugar beet. Finally, we present the modeling of the buffer zones.  
2.1  Motivation 
 
Following a large body of applied literature, we assume a Constant Relative Risk Aversion 






- = . Following OECD (2001), 
several  authors  have  shown  that  there  exist  agents  presenting  decreasing  absolute  risk 
aversion (Arrow, 1965; Binswanger, 1981; Saha, Shumway and Talpaz, 1994 and Chavas 
and Holt, 1990). While Saha, Shumway and Talpaz (1994) have found empirical evidence 
supporting increasing relative risk aversion, many authors have assumed constant relative 
risk aversion and have tried to estimate r. Following OECD (2001) results using Italian 
FADN  data  and  presented  in  Table  1,  relative  risk  aversion  would  show  considerable 
variations according to farm size. In Belgium, small farmers often have an additional job 6 
 
   
 
and  may  therefore  be  expected  to  present  smaller  risk  aversion  than  their  Italian 
counterparts. 
Table 1.  Relative risk aversion coefficients (r) 
Farm size  r  Asymptotic std dev 
Small    < 20 ha  3.29  0.88 
Medium  20-40 ha  0.72  0.20 
Large    > 40 ha  0.06   0.43 
Source: OECD, 2001. 
 
In  a  famous  experiment  conducted  in  India,  Binswanger  (1980)  shows  that  farmers’ 
choices are consistent with expected utility (while not with the “safety first” model); that 
they respond to fluctuations of their income rather than their wealth; and that their attitude 
towards risk is rather properly approximated by a CRRA utility function defined over their 
income with an aversion coefficient r ranging from 0.3 for small income changes and 1.7 
for  larger  changes.  The  mean  variance  approach  is  a  restrictive  particular  case  of  the 
expected utility model (Moschini and Hennessy, 2001). 
A difficulty with stochastic farm models when they are defined in terms of the dual cost 
function is that the cost function has a stochastic argument (farm output). Even though 
Pope and Just (1996) and Moschini (2001) have shown that an ex-ante cost function is still 
well defined when yields and prices are stochastic, its specification becomes much more 
complicated. A simple solution to avoid that problem is to define a cost function on the 
surface  allocations.  The  implicit  hypotheses  underlying  such  definition  is  that  farmers 
intend  to  reach  the  same  yield  across  all  the  areas  planted  to  one  crop  and  that  input 
decisions are not stochastic. If that is true, then surface allocations can be regarded as a 
measure of output and the yield in value as a stochastic price.  
In  this  way,  the  problem  of  correlated  price  and  yield  (see  e.g.  Moschini,  2001)  also 
disappears from the model. Since both prices and yields are observed per farm and per year 
for most crops in the FADN sample, it is possible to infer the distribution of the yield in 
value.  Additionally,  when  an  area  of  the  farm  is  under  contract  with  a  buyer  for  the 7 
 
   
 
production  of  some  crops,  typically  potatoes,  flax  and  colza,  only  the  yield  in  value 
appears in the FADN data, not the price and the yield separately. 
Input decisions can be stochastic if they are primarily a reaction to random events such as 
irrigation can be a reaction to drought. In Northwestern European agriculture however, 
water is usually not a limiting factor and it can be argued that most input decisions are 
committed at the same time as the farmer chooses the surface allocation.  
We assume that the input mix is fixed per hectare of each crop. There are five types of 
variable input expenses recorded in the RICA for crops (there are more for livestock): 
fertilizers  (chemical  and  organic,  pooled  until  2001),  treatments  or  pesticides,  hired 
services, seeds and other inputs (unspecified). Only input expenses are observed in the 
FADN  sample,  not  the  prices  or  any  measure  of  quantity.
1  Those  inputs  are  rather 
complementary, supporting the hypothesis that input expenses are fixed per ha.  
Nearly all the variable inputs are crop-specific. That is self evident for seeds, but that is 
also the case for the other variable inputs to a great extent. Consequently, in a multi-output 
variable  cost  function,  second-order  (cross-products)  terms  can  reasonably  be  assumed 
equal to zero. Another consequence is that across crops, the price per unit of a certain input 
does not refer to the same products, therefore, in terms of input intensity of an output, only 
the expense is relevant.  
Given these facts and the hypotheses that we have made, the variable cost can be written as 
a function of the surface allocations only. 
Fixed factors in the FADN belong to the “non-allocable” inputs (that is, for which the 
allocation  per  crop  is  not  given  in  the  FADN  data).  The  data  concern  primarily  labor 
(family and on farm) and capital (machines and other). Each crop requires the services of 
those fixed factors during definite periods in the course of one year (Just and Pope, 2003), 
but that allocation is not known in the FADN data. We assume that both capital and land 
                                                 
1 Considering the hundreds of products and services that belong to those inputs, it does not seem possible to 
consider actual quantity measures. That is why our modeling approach focuses on expenses. 8 
 
   
 
amounts and crop mix are chosen to match family labor, in other words, such that family 
labor is occupied more or less equally across the whole year.  
Consequently, surface allocation implicitly reflects fixed factors allocation along the year. 
With that simplification in mind, we see the farmer’s short-term economic problem as one 
purely of allocation in which deviation from the present allocation is increasingly costly. 
We borrow the argument from Howitt (1995): in the short run, if the farmer wants to 
increase the allocation of one crop (short of increasing the total farm surface), he has to 
allocate areas that are not as appropriate, for example because they fall out of rotation, but 
also because he will have to use fixed factors (including his own labor) more intensively or 
hire them. Because crops are requiring fixed factors services at different moment across the 
year, changing one crop allocation will not affect the marginal cost of producing another 
crop on the farm other than through the total surface constraint. In other words, a short-
term agricultural multi-output cost function should not have cross-products (second-order) 
terms.  
In modeling term, we can therefore write a short-term cost function simply by using the 
surface, without cross-products terms. It is a simplification, but it is a convenient way to 
represent technical relations on which there is no data since fixed factors allocation across 
crops during the year is not given in the FADN.  
In the following subsection, we present the formal crop model without agricultural policy. 
Then, in the next three subsections, we introduce the three main EU policies: subsidies and 
set-asides, sugar quota, agri-environmental measures. 
2.2  Formal crop model 
 
Let  E the mathematical expectation operator 
q the vector of yields in value calculated as output prices P (usually in euro per T) 
times physical yields Y (usually in T/ha) 
h the vector of area allocations (in hectares) 
C(h) the variable (or short-run) cost function 
j the agricultural land use domain, including crops, j = 1…J 9 
 
   
 
the notation ~ indicates a random variable – for example P ɶ  
the notation ˘ and ⌢ above or below another symbol indicates a computer simulated 
realization of a random variable – for example P
⌣
or P ⌢ . 
 
The farmer has a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function and has the 
following maximizing behavior: 
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            [2] 
Since  the  average  variable  cost  par  crop  1
2 j j j j C h a b = +   is  a  data,  we  can  write 
' 1
2 j j j j C C h b = + .  We  define  the  following  shorthand  notations:  ' EU W =   and 
' j j E U q   W =  
ɶ  where U' indicates the first derivative of the  utility function. The  First 





j j j j
j j
C h marginalrevenue marginalcost
h h totalareaconstraint
b w W = + W + =
= ∑
        [3] 
From the farmer’s point of view, the FOC constitute a system of J+1 non-linear equations 
in J+1 unknowns:  j h  – the land allocations – and w – the opportunity cost of land. The 
parameters of the cost function Cj(h) and of risk aversion r are known to him while the 
yields in value q ɶ  are random but of known distribution.  
From the investigator’s point of view, we observe supposedly optimal hectare allocations 
and realizations of the yields in value that are used to infer their distributions. In the system 10 
 
   
 
[3]  of  J+1  equations,  there  remain  J+2  unknowns:  the  risk  aversion  coefficient  r,  the 
opportunity cost of land w and the J b coefficients from the cost function.  
In  general,  there  is  therefore  infinity  of  solutions;  we  impose  a  value  of  one  for  the 
coefficient r based on Table 1. System [3] can then be used to solve for b and w by means 
of a numerical non-linear solver
2 in the following way: 






j j j j
j j j j
j
C h asintheFOC




W = + W +
W - W - =
W ∑
      [4] 
A  key  operational  difficulty  of  that  calibrating  approach  is  that  ' EU W =   and 
' j j E U q   W =  
ɶ  are integrals over non-linear function of random variables and therefore 
cannot  in  general  be  solved.  However,  provided  that  the  distribution  of  those  random 
variables is known, they can be numerically calculated by computer generating realizations 
of those variables. To this effect, we have used the FADN sample to test what distribution 
best fitted the yield in value of each crop. We have used a fixed effect panel data model to 
filter out farm specific changes in yields. It turned out that, although most crops did not 
follow the normal distribution, their distribution tended to be uncorrelated. To simplify the 
computer simulation of those random variables, we have made the hypothesis that they 
were independent; that is, we assume that each  j q ɶ  is independent of the other elements of 
the vector q ɶ . Numerically solving the system [4] therefore only implies generating J series 
of S simulated values of the estimated distributions of the vector q ɶ . That is much easier 
than generating one series of simulations from a vector of correlated random variables. 
Therefore, the operational version of the calibrating system [4] is:  
                                                 
2 We use CONOPT3 as provided with the GAMS software. 11 
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⌣           [5] 
Using [5], the system [4] can be solved farm per farm for every year for which there are 
data. The solutions will be different each time, implying a lack of robustness of the results. 
A potential solution would be to use econometric techniques to estimate the parameters of 
a more general cost function, but in the meantime, we calibrate the model on the year 2003 
on the basis that it is the last year with fully complete data.  
2.3  Subsidies and Set-asides 
 
The EU Common Agricultural Policy is characterized by area subsidies denoted  j S  that 
are received for the so-called “COP” crops.
3 The subsidies actually received per farm and 
per year are available per crop in the FADN dataset. Farmers are entitled to receive those 
subsidies only if they set-aside a certain percentage denoted  j r  of their COP area each 
year. In the formal model below,  0 j r =  for non-COP crops. Farmers receive a subsidy 
f S  on the set aside area. The set aside area also has a cost  f C  since it must be seeded, 
sowed and generally maintained. We assume that because the farmer does not intend to 
maximize  output  on  the  set  aside  area,  the  cost  function  is  simply  linear,  that  is 
( ) f f f j j j C h h a r = ∑ . Formally, model [1] becomes 
( ) ( )
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The FOC are: 
                                                 
3 Cereals, oleaginous crops, oilseed crops called “protéagineux” in French, hence the name. 12 
 
   
 
( ) ( )
( )
1
2 . . ,
1 .
j j j f j j j f j
j j j
S S C h marg revenue marg cost
h h totalareaconstraint
r b a r w
r
W + + W = + + W + =
+ = ∑
 
There are still J+1 equations in the FOC (set-aside is not included in the j domain), but 
there are now J+1 average cost equations since the FADN dataset provides the cost of the 
set-aside area. Since we have assumed that the set-aside cost function was linear, there is 
only  one  additional  parameter  f a   and  it  is  identified  by  the  additional  average  cost 
equation. 
2.4  Sugar Beet Quota 
 
In the Walloon region, sugar is exclusively produced by means of sugar beet. Nearly all 
crop farms in that region produce sugar beets and it is deemed the most profitable crop. 
The sector is heavily regulated. The EU allocates sugar production quotas to each member 
state that allocates them to the sugar refineries. In Belgium, the sugar refineries themselves 
are regulated: each plant is assigned a zone for collecting the beet and allocates delivery 
rights  a Q  to beet growers; no outsider may enter the industry. Farmers receive a fixed 
price  a P  per ton of beet delivered to the refinery up to the level of his delivery right; they 
may deliver more, but then receive only the uncertain world price  c P ɶ .
4 The problem of the 
beet growers is then to meet at least their delivery rights.
5 The penalty for not reaching 
a Q is not receiving the high price  a P  while the penalty  for supplying too much is the 
                                                 
4 In many EU countries, there is a quota called “A”, for which the EU pays the highest price (Pa), and a “B” 
quota, for which the price is lower, yet quite higher than the world price. Any amount of sugar produced 
above the quota must be exported (indeed “dumped”) outside the EU at world price; by analogy with the A 
and B quotas, the exported sugar is called “C quota” while there is no quantity restriction and the world price 
is called C price (Pc). In belgium, the A and B quotas have been pooled, we call the pooled quota “A” and its 
price Pa for simplicity.  
The farmer is in fact paid per ton of sugar delivered to the refinery, which is only known when the beets have 
been processed, some time after delivery. Therefore there is an amount of uncertainty regarding the price of 
the beet but it is quite small since farmers apparently control the sugar content quite precisely. 
5 Farmers have the possibility of delivering up to 10% more than their assigned quota but whatever excess 
they have will be discounted from their quota the next year. In the formal model, the delivery right Qa is the 
actual right including the additional 10% minus the previous year excess supply. 13 
 
   
 
difference between  c P ɶ  and the cost of the sugar beet produced above  a Q .
6 Writing the 
index sb for sugar beet and y ɶ  for the random physical yield, formally, model [1] becomes: 
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( ) ( ) 1
1 ; 0
a a c a sb sb a
sb sb a
R PQ zP z P h Q sugarrevenue
z if h Q z else sugarindicator
y
y
  = + + - -  
= > =
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ ɶ
 
The sugar revenue equation can be interpreted as follows. The farmer is entitled to a sure 
price  a P  for a known delivery right  a Q . If he produces at least  a Q ,  1 z = ɶ , he receives the 
world price for the quantity delivered above the right, that is  ( ) c sb sb a P h Q y - ɶ ɶ . Conversely 
if he does not meet the right,  0 z = ɶ , his entitlement is reduced by the missing quantity 
valued at the high price,  ( ) a sb sb a P h Q y - ɶ . The indicator variable  z ɶ  is stochastic because 
the beet yield is uncertain; the more hectares the farmers plants with beet, the surer he is to 
meet his quota. The marginal stochastic revenue for sugar is  ( ) 1 c a sb mR zP z P y   = + -  
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ : 
for a given area of beet, for an additional hectare of beet, the farmer will receive  c sb Py ɶ ɶ  if 
he meets his quota but  a sb Py ɶ  if he does not. 
The FOC are: 






' : . . ,
: . . ,
.
sb sb sb
j j j j
j sb j
E mRU C h sugar marg revenue marg cost
C h othercrops marg revenue marg cost
h h h totalareaconstraint
b w
b w
= + W + =




                                                 
6 There is in principle the possibility that a farmer who fails to meet his delivery right for three consecutive 
years may loose the corresponding part of his right. That would in effect increase the penalty but the threat is 
in fact void because farmers have the possibility to transfer beet between themselves.  14 
 
   
 
The system of FOC can be used to calibrate the parameters of the variable cost function in 
the same way as in model [1]. It is remarkable that in a stochastic model with risk aversion, 
the sugar beet FOC becomes smooth because the quota is reached ex ante in probability 
rather than with certainty. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below. The left panel represents 
the  beet  sugar  FOC  in  a  non-stochastic  model  in  which  the  marginal  revenue  drops 
discreetly from the supported price to the world price. In the right panel on the other hand, 
the  marginal  revenue  becomes  probabilistic  and  the  quota  is  reached  ex  ante  with 
increasing probability as the area planted with beet increases. 





















   
 
2.5  Buffer Zones 
 
EU farmers have the possibility to engage in Agri-Environmental Measures (AEM). AEM 
are outlined in a EU directive, but the detailed implementation is designed at the regional 
(“NUTS2”) level. AEM are, broadly speaking, non-strictly productive activities that are of 
local environmental or cultural interest. In the Walloon region, AEM include buffer zones, 
soil cover during winter, maintenance of hedges and ponds, rearing of local threatened 
domestic  species  and  extensive  (low  input)  management  of  grassland.  Each  AEM  is 
defined by a detailed plight of conditions. The farmer must declare his intention to uptake 
an AEM and commit to it for five years; in exchange, he receives a subsidy. 
We modify model [1] to include the most successful (in terms of total subsidies paid) AEM 
in the Walloon region: buffer zones.
7 Buffer zones are strips of grassland at most 20m wide 
that must be located along the borders of a tiled crop field. That limits the maximum 
possible total surface of buffer zones to 20m times the sum of the perimeters of the fields 
on the farms. The total buffer zones surface also cannot exceed 8% of the total tiled crop 
surface on the farm. We call  bf h  the minimum of these two maximums.
8 Computation of 
bf h  requires access to the agricultural land cover census at the field level. Such a dataset 
exists in EU countries because farmers must declare their land covers to the administration 
for the computation of the CAP subsidies they are entitled to. We call  bf h  the total area of 
buffer zones that the farmer has committed to. This data is also not present in the FADN 
dataset but there exists a census of all the AEM per farm and per year in every EU country. 
Writing  bf S  as the buffer zone subsidy, model [1] becomes: 
                                                 
7 It is the only AEM that competes with conventional crops for the allocation of surface. The other AEM do 
not occupy cropland, although they do require some fixed factors services, in particular, the farmer’s time. 
8 Buffer zones must also comply with a set of other conditions. They must be at least 4m wide on one or 
several sides of a tiled crops field. Each buffer zone must be at least 0.08ha but must be no larger than the 
crop area in that field. They must be seeded with local flora. No fertilizer or treatment can be used except for 
localized treatments against certain plagues. They must be sowed at least once no earlier that late summer 
and generally kept free of any use.  16 
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The model with buffer zones is quite similar to the model without. The key difference is 
that  there  is  an  upper  quantity  constraint  on  buffer.  In  spite  of  the  general  belief  that 
buffers are highly profitable, most farms are not at the upper limit. We deduce that there 
must be hidden costs that may be caused by the fact that buffer operations take place at 
roughly the same time during the year as cereals. To capture such an interior point solution 
we resort to a  complementary slackness constraint for buffer: either the upper limit is 
reached, and then the shadow cost of buffer may be positive, or the upper limit is not 
reached. Either way, the system of FOC allows us to calibrate the coefficients of the cost 
and the shadow values of the constraints. 
 
3. Description of the Sample 
 
Table 2 shows summary statistics for our sample of 24 crops farms without significant 
livestock in the FADN sample from 1995 to 2004 in the Walloon region. Those farms are a 
subsample of the complete sample of crop farms. We have also removed farms that are not 
observe for at least five years.  17 
 
   
 
Table 2.  Sample description 
Farms descriptive statistics 
Total number of crops observations excluding fall  924 
Average number of crops  4.2 
Average ha  78.2 
Average gross margin (Euro/ha)  1021.0 
Average area subsidy (Euro/ha)  162.1 
 
Source: based on FADN 1995-2004 
 
Table 3 presents the profile of agricultural choices. Sixteen crops (excluding set asides) are 
present in the sample, but the most important ones in term of area are winter wheat and 
sugar beet. Chicory (a vegetable used for the production of inuline, a sugar substitute) and 
potato are the second most important crops, but their area is already quite small compared 
to wheat and beet. Buffer zone occupies only a small area on the farms on which it is 
present (6 in our sample). 
Table 3.  Main crops of farms without significant livestock in the Walloon region  
  Winter wheat  Sugar beet  Chicory  Potato  Buffer zone 
Average ha of crop per farm  30.0  27.7  9.7  12.7  1.8 
Average ha per year  887.4  828.5  135.6  132.7  7.2 
Average yield (T)  8.2  35.7  22.4  11.4  n.a. 
Average gross margin including 
area subsidy (Euro/ha)  970.9  1177.9  1205.1  1769.3  896.2 
Relative  average  std  dev  gross 
margin per ha across years (%)  23.6  30.4  28.1  39.5  3.2 
Average area subsidy (Euro/ha)  359.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  914.7 
 




In  this  section,  we  introduce  various  scenarios  for  simulation.  The  modeling  of  each 
scenario is presented in subsections and followed by the results for the Walloon sample. 18 
 
   
 
In simulations, we use the results of the calibration to evaluate the reactions of the farm to 
of a change of its environment. The simulation model is the same as the calibration model, 
except that in the simulations, we use the results of the calibration regarding the parameters 
a  and  b  of  the  cost  function  and  we  let  the  model  optimize  on  the  surfaces  h.  The 
simulation model, complete with subsidies, set-aside, sugar quota and buffer zones is the 
following. The index j represents any “crop” or land cover except sugar beet (sb), set aside 
(fall f) or buffer (bf).  
( ) ( ) ( )
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As  before,  we  define  shorthand  notations:  ' EU W = ,  ' j j E U q   W =  
ɶ   and 
( ) 1 c a sb mR zP z P y   = + -  
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ , the marginal stochastic revenue for sugar. The FOC are: 19 
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        [7] 
4.1  Simple Scenarios: Price, Subsidy and Sugar Quota 
Changes 
 
In this subsection, we present scenarios that involve only simple changes of exogenous 
variables. We consider changes of the prices of wheat and “C” sugar (see subsection 2.4), 
buffer zone subsidy and sugar quota.  
In  a  stochastic  model,  a  change  in  price  has  to  be  considered  in  two  dimensions: 
expectation and variance. Depending on the change in variance, an increase in expected 
price may not always be desirable for the farmer. We examine a wheat price change at 
constant  absolute  variance  (Var(P)  is  constant)  and  at  constant  relative  variance 
(Var(P)/E(P) is constant). Recall that the yield in value is the product of the price and the 
yield  j j j P q = Y ɶ ɶ ɶ  and assume a change in the expected value of the price. The two cases 
are: 
·  ( )
*
j j j P e q = + Y ɶ ɶ ɶ ,  when  e  is  not  stochastic,  that  is  a  price  change  at  constant 
absolute variance and decreasing (if e>0) relative variance, that could be an output 
subsidy, 
·  ( )
* 1 j j j f P q = + Y ɶ ɶ ɶ , when f is not stochastic, that is a change at constant relative 
variance and increasing (if f>0) absolute variance, a demand change could cause 
such a price change. 20 
 
   
 
We examine two scenarios: a reduction of 10% of the expected price of winter wheat at 
constant  absolute  variance  (corresponding  to  a  reduction  of  output  subsidy)  and  at 
decreasing absolute variance (corresponding to a demand reduction).  
The  third  scenario  represents  a  ban  of  the  EU  sugar  export.  That  can  be  modeled 
straightforwardly  by  means  of  setting  the  world  price  of  sugar  to  zero.  In  the  fourth 
scenario, we present a decrease of the A sugar quota of 10%. Finally, we present a scenario 
of increase of the buffer zone subsidy of 10%. Table 4 presents the corresponding changes 
in expected hectareage over the sample of 24 crops farms for winter wheat, sugar beet and 
buffer zone. 
Table 4.  Expected Hectarage of Wheat, Sugar and Buffer under Five Scenarios 
Scenario  State  Unit  Winter Wheat  Sugar Beet  Buffer Zone 
0  Initial situation  Ha  642  650  7 
1  Pwheat – .1 wheat P   % difference  -3.4  3.9  0.7 
2  .9 Pwheat  % difference  -3.6  3.8  0.7 
3  Pc = 0   % difference  6.5  -8.7  0.9 
4  .9 SugarA quota  % difference  1.6  -2.5  0.1 
5  Sbf + 10%   % difference  -0.4  1.2  5.5 
 
Scenarios 1 and 2 correspond to a drop of roughly 10% of the expected yield in value of 
wheat; however, in scenario 1 the variance remains roughly constant (it decreases in fact 
by 4%) while in scenarios 2 it decreases by about 20%. That difference in variance does 
not  however  cause  a  sizable  difference  in  area  allocation  for  risk-averse  farmers.  As 
discussed in the introduction, that result is consistent with the low variability of the yield in 
value of the winter wheat. Scenarios 3 and 4 lead to the somewhat surprising result that a 
ban  on  EU  sugar  export  (Pc  =  0)  has  a  stronger  effect  (minus  nearly  9%  sugar  beet 
hectares) than a reduction of 10% of the sugar A quota (minus 2.5% sugar beet hectares). 
That suggests that Walloon beet growers profitably sell on the world market, thus even if 
the quota decreases, they continue planting about the same area of beet. Finally, a 10% 
increase of the buffer zone subsidy leads to a 5.5% increase of the buffer zone area. That 
result is based on only 6 farmers who do buffer zones in our sample; it can therefore be 21 
 
   
 
quite unreliable but it shows that it is possible to combine geographical information and 
farm accounting data to analyze scenarios regarding non purely agricultural activities.  
 
4.2  Crop Insurance for Wheat 
 
When a farmer has subscribed crop insurance, if the yield falls below a contractual level 
(usually the farm average yield minus a deductible), the farmer receives the difference 
valued at some contractual price (the insurance premium is a function of that price). That is 
equivalent to truncate the distribution of the physical yield  wheat Y ɶ  at the observed farm 
average  wheat Y  minus the deductible. To simplify, we follow the current French insurance 
system  and  impose  that  the  farmer  can  only  contract  at  the  farm  average  price.  Thus, 
assuming that the farmer insures all the area allocated to wheat, if  wheat wheat f Y < Y ɶ  (where 
f  =  1  -  deductible),  then  the  distribution  of  the  yield  in  value  wheat q ɶ   has  a  spike  at 
wheat wheat P f Y . 
The effect of insurance on the distribution of the  yield in value is not straightforward 
because the price distribution is correlated with the physical yield distribution. In other 
words, when the yield is below the insured threshold, the price may be high enough to 
make  the  insurance  unnecessary,  or  even  unprofitable  for  the  farmer.  To  estimate  the 
distribution of the yield in value conditional to the physical yield being larger than the 
insured lower bound (farm average minus deductible), we use the FADN sample in which 
we delete all the observations such that  wheat wheat f Y < Y ɶ  and we use a panel data model to 
filter  out  farm-specific  effects.  Let  wheat q
ɶ
  be  the  yield  in  value  conditional  to 
wheat wheat f Y > Y ɶ ;  after  estimating  the  distribution  of  wheat q
ɶ
,  we  can  computer-generate 
values  wheatS q ⌢ . Thus, in summary: 22 
 
   
 
With probability  { } Pr wheat wheat g f = Y < Y ɶ ,  wheat wheat wheat P q f = Y ɶ , 
With probability 1 g - ,  wheat wheat q q = ɶ
ɶ
, simulated by  wheatS q ⌢ . 
To choose  whether to contract crop insurance  for wheat, the farmer solves system [7] 
modified by replacing  wheatS q
⌢
 par  ( ) 1 wheat wheat wheats P gf g q Y + - ⌢  and adding the insurance 
premium  to  the  cost  of  producing  wheat.  These  changes  also  affect  ' EU W =   and 
' j j E U q   W =  
ɶ .  
In practice for Walloon farms the distribution of the yield in value does not change much 
when insurance is contracted. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the residuals of a fixed 
effects panel data regression on the yields in value for wheat in the FADN Walloon sample 
in 1996-2003. The top panel shows the distribution for the whole sample while the bottom 
panel shows all the cases in which physical yields lower than 90% of the farm average over 
the years 1996-2003 have been removed. In both panels, the rectangles show the observed 
histogram while the curve represents the best-fitted parametric distribution according to 
one  statistical  test.
9  Figure  2  clearly  shows  that  crop  insurance  barely  modifies  the 
distribution of the yield in value: to a low physical yield does not generally correspond a 
low price, and therefore the crop insurance does not truncate the distribution of the yield in 
value. That may explain the historical lack of success of crop insurances in Belgium.  
 
                                                 
9 Different tests unfortunately lead to different “best-fit” distributions. In the case of wheat, the extreme 
value, gamma and Weibull distribution are usually among the best distributions for any test. The important 
feature of those distributions in the present case seems to be that they are skewed to left. 23 
 
   
 




Sample of the observations larger than 90% of the farm average physical yield 
Source: FADN 1996-2003 – residuals of fixed effect panel data regression 
Axis units correspond to normalizations and are not shown. 
 
The model imposes the insurance to the farmer at the stated cost, he does not have the 
choice whether to insure or not. The current typical French premium for winter wheat is 
about 15 Euro/ha. Table 5 presents the changes in acreage allocations accordingly with the 
cost of the crop insurance (premium). These changes are very small, reflecting the small 
yield variability of wheat in the Walloon region. Those results are consistent with the 
results of scenario 1 and 2 above. 
Table 5.  Hectareage Allocations for Different Premiums  
  Unit  Winter Wheat  Sugar Beet  Buffer Zone 
Observed (no insurance)  ha  642  650  7 
Simulated with premium = 0  % difference  0.5  -0.1  0.6 
Simulated with premium = 7.5€/ha  % difference  0.3  0.2  0.7 
Simulated with premium = 15€/ha  % difference  0.1  0.2  0.6 
Simulated with premium = 30€/ha  % difference  -0.3  0.5  0.7 
 
5. Discussion 
   
Because the model is still in an intermediate level of development, in this section we will 
simply discuss some of the directions for future research that we are considering. 24 
 
   
 
We have shown how it is possible to represent the farm-level area allocation behavior of 
risk-averse farmers in the presence of random yields and prices under fixed total farm 
surface. We have modeled the sugar quota constraint, the Common Agricultural Policy 
subsidies  and  set-aside,  and  the  buffer  zone  Agri-Environmental  Measure.  We  have 
applied the approach to a sample of crop farms from Belgian Walloon region.  
The model is based solely on ex-post data collected in the FADN and in the agricultural 
land  cover  census:  yields,  prices,  area  allocations  (including  for  Agri-Environmental 
Measures) and expenses in variable inputs. These data have a high degree of reliability. 
Observed panels of prices and yields are used to infer distributions that serve to calibrate 
the parameters of the cost function. In that sense it is not a calibration model based on a 
single period. Nevertheless, econometric estimation of the cost function across a panel of 
farms has proved frustrating, as well as linking input expenses and yields.  
Finally, because different statistical tests rank parametric distributions differently regarding 
their fit to the data, it is difficult to compare the present results, based on the normal 
distribution, with the results generated by alternative distributions. Therefore, even though 
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